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Abstract—Many electronic applications use cryptographic al-
gorithms implemented in embedded devices to provide some form
of security, e.g. smart cards (banking, SIM, access control), mobile
phones, wifi routers, etc. The tight resource constraints of the
devices, typically silicon area and power or energy, together
with requirements from the application, typically latency or
throughput, demand highly efficient implementations of the often
computationally complex cryptographic algorithms. We provide
a broad overview of the hardware/software co-design space for an
essential component of many cryptographic protocols. Based on
our experience from teaching a master level course about hard-
ware/software co-design, we explore four typical implementation
options and provide concrete implementation results. In addition
to the aforementioned criteria, resistance against implementation
attacks is vital for the security of embedded cryptographic
devices. We analyze our four implementations with respect to a
security issue that is due to their electromagnetic emanations, and
highlight multiple vulnerabilities that can be exploited to break
their security. Next, we investigate state-of-the-art implementation
options that are supposed to resist these attacks. We detail
their implementation cost and show that it is non-trivial to
implement these options securely. Our main contribution is a
comprehensive analysis of many implementation options with
respect to implementation cost and attack resistance on a single
common platform.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Design of Digital Platforms is a master level course
that introduces students to the topic of hardware/software co-
design. The course is composed of theory-oriented lectures
and project-oriented sessions. Lectures cover aspects of data-
flow and control-flow analysis, impact of memory management
and design methodologies. Practical sessions provide insight
and hands-on experience by developing a public-key crypto-
graphic system [1]. This paper focuses on the project-oriented
sessions. We select Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [2],
[3] as exemplary hardware/software co-design application, as
previously done in [4]. Past editions of the course used other
cryptographic systems such as RSA [5].
An elliptic curve E over a prime field Fp with p > 3 can
be defined by the short Weierstrass equation y2 = x3+ax+b.
Here, a and b are preset parameters of the curve. The affine
coordinates (x, y) represent a point P on the elliptic curve.
An alternative representation widely used in practice is given
by projective coordinates. Here a point P is represented by
a tuple (X,Y, Z), where x = X/Z2 and y = Y/Z3. In the
course we employ a NIST prime-field curve [6] P-256 over Fp
where p = 2256 − 2224 + 2192 + 296 − 1.
Because of its mathematical and modular nature, an ECC
implementation can be developed by following a bottom-up ap-
proach as depicted in Figure 1 (left). This characteristic allows
one to divide project sessions into multiple assignments that
build on top of each other. The first assignments correspond to
the lower field arithmetic layer. Here, students have to imple-
ment operations over the prime field Fp, namely, field addition,
field subtraction and field multiplication. After this, students
move on to the implementation of the point arithmetic layer,
which include two operations: point addition (P3 = P1 + P2)
and point doubling (P3 = 2P1). We consider three different
algorithms to compute these operations: two for point addition
denoted as PADD_JJJ and PADD_JJA, and one for point
doubling denoted by PDBL_JJ. Here, we use J (Jacobian)
and A (affine) to refer to the coordinate representation of
P3, P1, and P2, respectively. Finally, upon completion of this
step, students arrive at the final assignment of the course: the
implementation of ECC scalar multiplication.
The implementation of the lower field arithmetic layer is
developed first in software and then in hardware. This allows
students to quickly grasp the obvious limitations of hardware-
only and software-only solutions, i.e. software results in slow
but flexible implementations, while hardware achieves fast
designs at higher area costs but is unupdatable. These observa-
tions are extensively used in the remaining practical sessions.
The end goal of the project is to obtain an implementation that
optimizes the typical co-design trade-off between area, speed
and flexibility, as illustrated in Figure 1 (right).
Fig. 1. Implementation layers of ECC (left), co-design trade-off (right).
The algorithms to perform ECC scalar multiplication, point
arithmetic and field arithmetic are fixed at the beginning
of the course to allow a fair comparison between students’
designs. Regarding the final assignment, students are asked
to implement the double-and-add binary scalar multiplication
depicted in Alg. 1. Given a point P ∈ Fp and a scalar k, the
algorithm computes a new point Q ∈ Fp of the form Q = kP .
The structure of Alg. 1 is rather simple. It iterates over each
bit of the input scalar k and performs at most two point
operations per iteration: a point doubling PDBL_JJ followed
by a conditional point addition PADD_JJA when ki equals
one.
Algorithm 1 Double-and-add (left-to-right).
INPUT: Base point P ∈ E(Fp), scalar k = (kt−1, . . . , k0)2
OUTPUT: Point Q = k · P
R0 ←∞; R1 ← P
for i = t− 1 to 0 do
R0 ← PDBL_JJ(R0)
if ki == 1 then
R0 ← PADD_JJA(R0, R1)
end if
end for
Q = R0
In order to allow students to explore the full co-design
space, we select a representative target platform composed of
an 8-bit microcontroller (i.e. software) attached to a customiz-
able arithmetic co-processor (i.e. hardware). The popular 8051
architecture is selected as embedded microcontroller. Its four
8-bit parallel ports are used to interface with the arithmetic
co-processor and to enable a shared memory component, as
illustrated in Figure 2. The MCU 8051 Integrated Development
Environment [7] is used for software development, while the
GEZEL [8], [9] description language is used for hardware
development and co-simulation.
Fig. 2. Architecture for target platform.
The combination of hardware and/or software solutions
with the implementation granularity of the ECC arithmetic
pyramid gives rise to multiple designs and to multiple trade-off
options. In general, however, the vast majority of students in
the course end up with one of the following partitions between
hardware and software:
1) Co-processor supports field multiplication.
2) Co-processor supports field arithmetic (addition, sub-
traction and multiplication).
3) Co-processor supports point arithmetic (point dou-
bling, point addition).
4) Co-processor supports scalar multiplication.
A. Structure and contributions
In the rest of the paper we evaluate each of these hard-
ware/software partitions. In Section II we describe our own
implementations of four co-processor implementations. Each
of these designs is representative of the implementations
achieved by students, and as such it maps to a particular
generic co-design boundary. We provide a detailed evaluation
of the cost of all implementations by implementing them on an
FPGA. This analysis follows the same criteria as in the course,
i.e. focusing on area, speed and flexibility. In Section III we
add a fourth dimension criteria in the analysis of the designs,
namely security against electromagnetic side-channel attacks.
By means of practical experiments, we highlight multiple
vulnerabilities found in these generic designs. We further
analyze the role of the hardware/software partition in each
vulnerability. In Section IV we introduce techniques from
the literature that aim to solve these issues. They are based
on algorithms for ECC scalar multiplication with constant
patterns of point operations. We demonstrate that while these
algorithms are indeed suited to counter electromagnetic side-
channel attacks, their secure implementation is non-trivial.
Finally, we conclude in Section V.
II. THE CO-PROCESSORS
We prepared four different arithmetic co-processors ac-
cording to the common partitions used by the students. We
prepared these co-processors so that they are modular in the
sense that the next co-processor supports all functionalities of
the previous one. Implementation details of our co-processors
are described in the following subsections together with their
implementation results on a Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA.
A. Co-processor 1 (CP 1)
The simplest co-processor (CP 1) provides support for field
multiplication. The finite field multiplier of CP 1 computes
N -bit multiplications, where N = 256, using a W × N -bit
multiplier and a N + W -bit adder that accumulates a 2N -bit
shift register. Let B(i) denote the ith W -bit word of B: B =∑N/W−1
i=0 B(i)2
Wi. The operands are fed to the multiplier one
word per clock cycle. The entire element A is first loaded
into the multiplier using a W -bit interface. Then, each B(i) is
loaded starting from B(0) and multiplied by A using the W ×
N -bit multiplier. The accumulator updates the least significant
N + W bits of the shift register and shifts the register by
W bits. When all B(i) have been processed, the shift register
contains the 512-bit result of the integer multiplication so that
the most significant N−W bits contain the least significant bits
and the least significant N+W bits contain the most significant
bits of the result. The result of the integer multiplication is
reduced modulo p using the formulae given in [6]. The result
of the modular multiplication is returned one W -bit word per
clock cycle starting from the least significant word. The latency
of a multiplication is 3N/W + 3 clock cycles. CP 1 reads
operands from and writes results to the XRAM using the 8-bit
interface of the XRAM. Hence, the logical choice for the word
size is W = 8 bits. The 8×256-bit multiplier was implemented
using hardwired multipliers (DSP blocks) available on Xilinx
Virtex-5 FPGAs. Field multiplications and the interface are
governed by finite state machines.
B. Co-processor 2 (CP 2)
The next co-processor (CP 2) adds support for field addi-
tions and subtractions. The finite field adder/subtractor com-
putes additions and subtractions W bits per clock cycle. Let
TABLE I. AREAS AND MAXIMUM CLOCK FREQUENCIES OF THE FOUR CO-DESIGN PARTITIONS.
Design Slices LUTs Flip-Flops DSP48Es BlockRAMs Max. freq. (MHz)
µC + CP 1 2010 6457 1915 26 6 39.97
µC + CP 2 2237 7268 2470 26 6 39.01
µC + CP 3 2392 7556 2603 27 6 38.93
µC + CP 4 2525 8015 2896 27 6 39.36
A(i) denote the ith W -bit word of A. The elements are fed to
the adder/subtractor one word per clock cycle as follows: A(0),
B(0), A(1), B(1), . . . , A(N/W −1), and B(N/W −1). Each
clock cycle the adder/subtractor computes A(i) + B′(i) + c,
where c is the carry from the previous iteration (initialized with
zero for additions and one for subtractions) and B′(i) = B(i)
for additions and B(i) = B¯(i) (all bits of B(i) flipped) for
subtractions, and stores the result in an N-bit shift register.
Modular reduction is performed so that either p or −p is added
to the N+1-bit result for subtraction and addition, respectively,
after which either the original result or the result of the addition
is selected depending on their signs. The result of a modular
addition or subtraction is returned one W -bit word per clock
cycle starting from the least significant word. The latencies
of addition and subtraction are both 3N/W + 2 clock cycles.
Similarly to CP 2, the interface of the XRAM dictates that
W = 8 also for CP 2. The execution of field operations and
the interface are controlled by finite state machines.
C. Co-processor 3 (CP 3)
As mentioned both CP 1 and CP 2 operate directly using
the XRAM so that they fetch the operands from the XRAM
in the beginning of each operation and write the result to
the XRAM immediately after the end of the operation. As
shown above, the latencies of multiplications, additions, and
subtractions are almost completely determined by the width
W of their interface. In the case of CP 1 and CP 2, the
performance was bounded by the 8-bit interface of the XRAM
and, hence, the only logical choice was W = 8. Therefore, the
latencies of the field operations were relatively long.
The next co-processor (CP 3) solves this limitation by
computing entire point operations on the co-processor. CP 3
adds an internal register file for storing intermediate values
and, consequently, it largely avoids the limits of the 8-bit
XRAM interface if several field operations are computed
with values read from the XRAM once. In addition to field
multiplications, additions, and subtractions, CP 3 is further
capable of computing point operations so that it fetches the
operand points P1 and P2 from the XRAM, computes the point
operation, and writes the result point P3 to the XRAM. Hence,
CP 3 is less bounded by the 8-bit interface of the XRAM and
a larger W can be used in the field multiplier resulting in
significantly faster multiplications (we used W = 32 for CP 3).
Also for CP 3, the 32 × 256-bit multiplier was implemented
using hardwired multipliers (DSP blocks) available on Xilinx
Virtex-5 FPGAs.
CP 3 supports all three algorithms for point operations
using Jacobian coordinates: PADD_JJJ, PADD_JJA, and
PDBL_JJ. Field squarings required by the algorithms are com-
puted using the field multiplier and multiplications by small
constants are computed with the adder (e.g., X1 ← 4 × X1
is computed X1 ← X1 + X1 followed by X1 ← X1 + X1).
The algorithms can be implemented with ten N -bit registers:
X1, Y1, Z1, X2, Y2, Z2, T1, T2, T3, and T4. All ten registers
are used only by PADD_JJJ. The 10 × 256-bit register file
was implemented using distributed RAM. The algorithms were
derived using the formulae available in the online Explicit-
Formulas Database [10]. Note that the Alg. 1 is implemented
with PADD_JJA and PDBL_JJ. The reason why CP 3 in-
cludes also support for PADD_JJJ is due to security related
improvements which are discussed later in Sect. III.
D. Co-processor 4 (CP 4)
The last co-processor (CP 4) adds hardware support also
for scalar multiplication algorithms and, consequently, removes
the need for software control during scalar multiplication. CP 4
fetches the scalar k and the generator point P from the XRAM,
stores them to the register file, computes Q = kP using one of
the supported algorithms, and writes Q to the XRAM. Hence,
the amount of data that needs to be transferred between CP 4
and the XRAM using the slow 8-bit interface is very small.
The students’ solutions include support only for Alg. 1.
However, because of security related considerations discussed
later in the paper, we implemented CP 4 to support three
algorithms for scalar multiplication: Alg. 1, Alg. 2, and Alg. 3.
Point operations and scalar multiplication algorithms are exe-
cuted by using finite state machines. Both Alg. 1 and Alg. 3 can
be implemented with the ten registers available in the register
file of CP 3. However, Alg. 2 requires three additional registers
for the dummy point R−1. Hence, the register file of CP 4
includes 13 N -bit registers. Also this 13×256-bit register file
was implemented using distributed RAM.
E. Performance
All designs were described in VHDL and compiled for
Xilinx Virtex-5 xc5vlx30-2ff324 FPGA using Xilinx ISE 13.4
software. Table I collects the area and performance results
(after place&route). As can be seen, the growth in area was
moderate between the designs because most of the resources
are used by the multiplier. The register files were implemented
using distributed RAM which significantly decreased their
resource requirements. The use of a larger W in CP 3
and CP 4 resulted in an only relatively small increase in
area requirements. Regardless of the implementation, the area
requirements for the embedded microcontroller were constant
and amounted to 1 101 slices and 500 flip flops. These numbers
are already included in the results of Table I.
Latencies of different operations supported by the co-
processors (in clock cycles) are listed in Table II. They include
the interfacing with the XRAM but not delays depending on
the software. In other words, they represent the optimal case
in which the software side has no overhead on the overall
computation. The dash (—) indicates that the operation is not
supported by the co-processor. The latencies are accompanied
by either C or V depending whether the latency is constant
TABLE II. LATENCIES OF OPERATIONS SUPPORTED BY THE CO-PROCESSORS.
Co-processor Multiplication Addition Subtraction PDBL_JJ PADD_JJA PADD_JJJ Alg. 1 Alg. 2 Alg. 3
CP 1 100 (C) — — — — — — — —
CP 2 100 (C) 99 (C) 99 (C) — — — — — —
CP 3 147 (C) 146 (C) 146 (C) 899 (C) 801 (C) 1,148 (C) — — —
CP 4 147 (C) 146 (C) 146 (C) 899 (C) 801 (C) 1,148 (C) 240,000 (V) 306,000 (C) 387,000 (C)
(C) constant, (V) varying
or varying depending on the value of the operands and/or
the secret scalar k. CP 3 and CP 4 compute field operation
instructions slightly slower than CP 1 and CP 2 because the
elements are first written into the register file. For the scalar
multiplication algorithms, it is assumed that k is a 256-bit
integer where half of the bits are ones; the latency of scalar
multiplication is considered constant if it does not depend on
the number of ones in the scalar k.
III. SECURITY EVALUATION
In addition to the criteria area, speed and flexibility, resis-
tance against side-channel attacks is vital for embedded appli-
cations of cryptography. It is well known that straightforward
implementations without explicit consideration of this security
aspect can be easily broken by a variety of attacks [11].
Here we focus on attacks using simple electromagnetic anal-
ysis [12], [13].
For our security evaluation, we implemented each of the
four designs (µC and co-processor) in a Xilinx Spartan3E-
500 FPGA on a development board and clocked it at 24 MHz
frequency. We placed the board on a X-Y-Z positioning system
and attached it with a custom jig to prevent any movement
of the board relative to the positioning system. We used a
magnetic near field probe [14] (500 µm diameter, horizontal
orientation) to capture electromagnetic emanations above the
upper surface of the FPGA. This type of measurement setup
is common in EMC testing.
We positioned the probe less than 50 µm above the FPGA
package to obtain a good signal strength. We conditioned the
signal with a built-in pre-amplifier, a 48 MHz low-pass filter
and an additional amplifier (30 dB) before sampling it with a
digital storage oscilloscope at a rate of 125 MS/s. In contrast to
EMC testing, where one is usually interested in the frequency
spectrum, we are interested in a time signal.
Figure 3 shows a plot of the field amplitude over time
(EM trace) measured while the first implementation with CP 1
performs an elliptic curve scalar multiplication. We can clearly
see when the operation begins (the amplitude increases) and
when it ends (the amplitude drops). We can further observe
that it takes about 400 ms (approx. 107 cycles) to complete
the operation.
Figure 4 shows a zoom of the same EM trace. It covers
the first few point operations. The field multiplier constitutes
roughly 50% of the FPGA resources used in this implementa-
tion, and it performs a multiplication in short time compared to
addition and subtraction that are implemented in software. This
leads to high, fast changing currents and hence relatively strong
emissions. In the figure, the horizontal “band” represents
the microcontroller’s activity whereas the vertical peaks that
exceed the “band” are due to the multiplier’s activity.
Fig. 3. EM trace for double-and-add algorithm, implementation with CP 1,
full execution.
Fig. 4. EM trace for double-and-add algorithm, implementation with CP 1,
execution of a few point operations.
Figure 5 shows an even more detailed zoom of two EM
traces (plotted in different shades of gray). The two traces were
captured during scalar multiplications of different input points
P . They are perfectly aligned at the beginning of the operation,
but they deviate from each other rather soon. The figure shows
a short sequence of four field multiplications that occurs in
both scalar multiplications, but at different time offsets.
Fig. 5. EM trace for double-and-add algorithm, implementation with CP 1,
execution of a few field operations.
The timing differences are deterministic and caused by the
non-constant time software implementations of field addition
and subtraction. Both these operations need to ensure that
the output value is a valid element in Fp, i.e. an integer in
the interval [0, p − 1]. Ensuring this requires the execution
of a conditional operation to obtain the correct result, giving
rise to timing variations depending on the data processed. An
adversary can exploit these differences and potentially recover
the full secret scalar from a single EM trace. It is therefore
crucial to address this problem, for instance by designing
implementations that execute in constant time.
The second implementation uses CP 2 that provides all
field arithmetic in constant time hardware. Figure 6 shows an
EM trace of this implementation. A first observation is that
this implementation requires about 120ms (approx. 3 × 106
cycles) to complete the scalar multiplication.
Fig. 6. EM trace for double-and-add algorithm, implementation with CP 2,
full execution.
We verified that the field arithmetic in CP 2 indeed executes
in constant time. However, there are more security issues.
Figure 7 shows a zoom on the first four point operations in the
same EM trace. The field multiplier still constitutes roughly
50% of the FPGA resources in the implementation and its
activity causes the same clearly visible peaks.
Fig. 7. EM trace for double-and-add algorithm, implementation with CP 2,
execution of first four point operations.
The sequences of field operations for point doublings and
point additions are similar but not identical. Let M and A
denote field multiplication and field addition or subtraction,
respectively. The number and sequence of field operations for
each of these operations is:
PDBL_JJ: 4M→ 1A→ 5M→ 1A→ 3M→ 3A→ 1M→ 1A
PADD_JJA: 4M→ 2A→ 5M→ 1A→ 1M→ 3A→ 1M→ 1A
The figure shows that the number and sequence of peaks
in the EM trace directly corresponds to the number and
sequence of field multiplications. An adversary can exploit this
correspondence to recover the sequence of point operations,
which immediately leads to the secret scalar (recall Alg. 1),
potentially from a single EM trace. Implementations three and
four (with CP 3 and CP 4, respectively) require substantially
less time to process point operations and a scalar multiplica-
tion, but both suffer from the same vulnerability since they
also use the double-and-add algorithm.
IV. REGULAR SCALAR MULTIPLICATION ALGORITHMS
The literature provides two popular alternatives to the
double-and-add algorithm: the double-and-add-always algo-
rithm (see Alg. 2) and the Montgomery Ladder (see Alg. 3).
Algorithm 2 Double-and-add-always (left-to-right) [15].
INPUT: Base point P ∈ E(Fp), scalar k = (kt−1, . . . , k0)2
OUTPUT: Point Q = k · P
R0 ←∞; R1 ← P
for i = t− 1 to 0 do
b← ki
R0 ← PDBL_JJ(R0)
R−b ← PADD_JJA(R−b, R1)
end for
Q = R0
Algorithm 3 Montgomery Ladder (left-to-right) [16].
INPUT: Base point P ∈ E(Fp), scalar k = (kt−1, . . . , k0)2
OUTPUT: Point Q = k · P
R0 ←∞; R1 ← P
for i = t− 1 to 0 do
b← ki
R1−b ← PADD_JJJ(R1−b, Rb)
Rb ← PDBL_JJ(Rb)
end for
Q = R0
As discussed in Sect. III, Alg. 1 employs a pattern of point
operations dependent on k and, hence, it leaks information
about the secret value for an adversary who measures e.g.
the EM characteristics of the implementation when computing
scalar multiplications. Both Alg. 2 and Alg. 3, however, have
a constant pattern of point operations which significantly im-
proves their security against side-channel attacks. Nevertheless,
it is still not easy to implement these algorithms securely.
Figure 8 shows a zoom of two EM traces (plotted in
different shades of gray) that were captured during scalar
multiplications with two different keys K1 and K2. The
implementation uses CP 2 and the double-and-add-always
algorithm in software. K1 is equal to K2 except for the first
byte. The first byte of K1 is 1000 0000b while the first byte
of K2 is 1000 1000b. The figure shows a part of the point
addition computation during the processing of the key bit that
differs, i.e. kt−5. We can observe a small but noticeable time
shift between both traces. Before the processing of this key bit
both traces are perfectly aligned, and the time shift is constant
during the processing of the remaining key bits. This time
shift is deterministic and caused by if-then-else statements in
the software that determine if the point addition is real or
dummy. Hence, although the scalar multiplication algorithm
has a constant pattern of point operations, an adversary would
still be able to determine the value of the secret scalar, possibly
from a single EM trace, due to such conditional branches.
A secure implementation should therefore not use conditional
branches, which is not easy in particular in software.
Fig. 8. EM trace for double-and-add-always algorithm, implementation with
CP 2.
Although all of our co-processors are insecure if scalar
multiplications are computed using the double-and-add al-
gorithm (Alg. 1), they all offer features that enable secure
implementations if combined with scalar multiplication al-
gorithms that employ a constant pattern of point operations.
The supported field operations (multiplications, additions, and
subtractions) are always computed with constant latency which
nullifies efforts to determine the secret scalar by observing
varying latencies of field operations depending on the known
generator point P . Furthermore, all point operations supported
by CP 3 and CP 4 are computed with constant latencies (i.e.,
the latencies do not depend on the values of the input points P1
and P2 or the secret scalar k). However, an adversary may still
observe which particular point operation is being computed
because the pattern of field operations is different for different
point operations as explained in Sect. III. Hence, the point
operations offer side-channel resistance only when employed
by a scalar multiplication algorithm that has a constant pattern
of point operations such as Alg. 2 or Alg. 3. In summary, two
out of the three scalar multiplication algorithms supported by
CP 4 offer strong protection against adversaries who aim to
find the value of the scalar by observing a single power or EM
trace.
We must, however, emphasize that even CP 4 does not
offer foolproof protection against very powerful adversaries.
For instance, if an adversary is able to perform very precise
localized EM measurements, (s)he can be able to distinguish
which registers in the register file are written to at a given
point in time, which would allow breaking both Alg. 2 and
Alg. 3 [17]. Also, if the adversary is able to inject faults into
the computation, then (s)he can break Alg. 2 by corrupting the
result of a point addition [18]. If the fault corrupts the result
of the scalar multiplication, then it was injected during a real
point addition (ki = 1), if not, then it affected a dummy point
addition (ki = 0).
V. CONCLUSION
Elliptic curve scalar multiplication is an important build-
ing block in many cryptographic protocols. We provide a
comprehensive study of many implementation options in the
hardware/software co-design space focusing on the criteria
area, latency and security against electromagnetic side-channel
attacks. All our results stem from implementations on a single
common platform, hence their comparison is meaningful.
They can serve practitioners to make the right implementation
choices, and in particular point out security pitfalls.
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